送交者: 五角大楼 于 April 13, 2001 16:09:14:
Cellular telephone service does not yet appear to be a significant element of PLA military communications, although China has shown interest in establishing dedicated military cellular systems for PLA use. However, with the explosive growth of cellular communications in the civilian sector, cellular communications could become a significant element of PLA communications in the future. To date, PLA involvement has been concerned primarily with commercial exploitation of cellular communications.
China’s military communications network continues to be upgraded; however, the bulk of China’s military communications reportedly is processed on communications lines run by the Ministry of Information Industry. Both networks are composed largely of commercial off-the-shelf technology. This technology either is not restricted for sale to China or recently was decontrolled, although Beijing probably has been successful in obtaining some restricted technology to modernize its telecommunications network. Europe, Japan and Israel compete to sell telecommunications technology, as well as related hardware and software, to China.
b. Electronic Warfare Development
The thrust of China's electronic warfare (EW) efforts continues to focus on technology development and design capabilities improvement, accomplished mainly through cooperation with Western companies, through reverse engineering efforts, and through the procurement of foreign systems. The inventory of Chinese EW equipment includes a combination of 1950s-1980s technologies, with only a few select military units receiving the most modern components. China is procuring state-of-the-art technology to improve its intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. In addition to providing extended imagery reconnaissance and surveillance and electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection, Beijing's unmanned aerial vehicle programs probably will yield platforms for improved radio and radar jammers. Additionally, existing earth stations can be modified to interfere with satellite communications. The PLA also is developing an electronic countermeasures (ECM) doctrine and has performed structured training in an ECM environment.
c. Information Operations/Information Warfare
China increasingly is viewing Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW) as a strategic weapon to use outside of traditional operational boundaries. China's IO/IW is in the early stages of research. It currently focuses on understanding IW as a military threat, developing effective countermeasures, and studying offensive employment of IW against foreign economic, logistics, and C4I systems. Driven by the perception that China's information systems are vulnerable, the highest priority has been assigned to defensive IW programs and indigenous information technology development. Some technologies could provide enhanced defensive or offensive capabilities against foreign military and civilian information infrastructure systems. Computer anti-virus solutions, network security, and advanced data communications technologies are a few examples.
Over the last few years, the Communication Command Academy in Wuhan has emerged as one of the major PLA centers in IW research. In December 1998, under the auspices of "Project 95"-All Military Critical Development Projects," the Academy established the PLA’s first IW simulation experiment center. In the same year, the General Staff Department’s Communication Department endorsed two publications on IW for use as the PLA IW textbooks. A task force of 20 PLA IW theorists and instructors from the Academy wrote the books: Command and Control in Information Warfare and Technology in Information Warfare. They set forth the definition of IW, its areas of study, and the application of information technology in combat. The Academy offers 31 command and control related cross-disciplinary courses with emphasis on IW at the core of undergraduate and graduate training. The cross-disciplinary course "Command and Control of Information Warfare" indicates the PLA’s theoretical research on IW is fairly mature; however, the PLA has not yet developed a coordinated and integrated IW doctrine to match its maturing theory.
In the area of computer network attack (CNA), China appears interested in researching methods to insert computer viruses into foreign networks as part of its overall IO strategy. Beijing reportedly has adequate hardware and software tools and possesses a strong and growing understanding of the technologies involved. However, China's strategic IO use of advanced information technologies in the short- to mid-term likely will lack depth and sophistication; however, as it develops more expertise in defending its own networks against enemy attack, it is likely to step up attempts to penetrate foreign information systems.
Open source articles claim that the PLA has incorporated IO/IW-related scenarios and CNA activities into operational exercises. Efforts reportedly have focused on increasing the PLA's proficiency in defensive measures, especially against computer viruses. In Shenyang and Lanzhou MRs, open source reports describe scenarios where a GA HQ successfully defended its command and control network from a virus attack. In a separate tactical level exercise, another scenario called for hackers to intrude into the same GA command and control network for exploitation and destruction.
China has the capability to penetrate poorly protected US computer systems and could potentially use CNA to attack specific US civilian and military infrastructures. This anti-access strategy is centered on targeting operational centers of gravity, including C4I centers, airbases, and aircraft carrier battle groups located around the periphery of China.
2. Space Development
China has the capability to launch military photoreconnaissance satellites; however, the technology employed is outdated by Western standards. Beijing does not possess a real-time photoreconnaissance capability, but eventually may deploy advanced imagery reconnaissance and earth resource systems with military applications. The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) was launched in October 1999 and the experience gleaned from operating this satellite will support Beijing's efforts to develop improved military reconnaissance satellites. CBERS also will provide some militarily useful data. China also may attempt to deploy a near-real-time electro-optical imaging satellite within the next decade, as well as a high-resolution film-based photoreconnaissance satellite. In the interim, Beijing can be expected to exploit commercial SPOT and LANDSAT imagery. Use of other commercial higher resolution satellite imagery also can be anticipated, as it becomes available.
China already has launched three low-orbit meteorological satellites and a geosynchronous weather satellite. Although Beijing has received some degree of foreign technological assistance in the areas of reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting capabilities, many of its system development efforts appear to have a substantial indigenous component. In the future, however, Beijing could be expected to acquire and incorporate greater amounts of foreign technology and hardware to expedite program development.
China is interested in 400-500 kilogram (kg) satellites and plans an oceanographic research satellite Haiyang 1 (Ocean-1) in this class that is scheduled for launch in 2001. Other missions for satellites of this class that Beijing eventually may field include earth observation, communications, and navigation. China also is developing minisatellites (weighing less than 100 kgs) for missions, which include remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites. A joint venture between China's Tsinghua University and Great Britain’s University of Surrey is building the "Tsinghua" system, a constellation of 7 minisatellites with 50-meter (m) resolution remote sensing payloads. The first satellite is scheduled for launch in 2000. Later satellites in the series probably will have improved resolution. In addition, Beijing participates in the Asia-Pacific Small Multi-Mission Satellite Project as part of the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications Program, which reportedly includes Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Mongolia, South Korea, and Bangladesh.
Although China is improving its overall space launch program, there is no evidence that it currently is developing the capability to conduct "launch-on-demand space launch operations," i.e., the capability to use satellites and space launch vehicles in storage to launch within 24 hours of a decision to do so.
Exploitation of space--to include manned space operations--remains a high priority. Although nearly all major aspects of China's manned space program began within the last five years or so, Beijing is still aiming for a possible first manned launch by 2001. While one of the strongest motivations for this program appears to be political prestige, China's manned space efforts could contribute to improved military space systems in the 2010-2020 time frame. In addition to scientific and technical experiments, Chinese astronauts, for instance, could investigate the utility of manned reconnaissance from space.
China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies, which could be used to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. Beijing already may have acquired technical assistance which could be applied to the development of laser radars used to track and image satellites and may be seeking an advanced radar system with the capability to track satellites in low earth orbit. It also may be developing jammers, which could be used against Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. In addition, China already may possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers. Beijing also may have acquired high-energy laser equipment and technical assistance, which probably could be used in the development of ground-based ASAT weapons. Given China's current level of interest in laser technology, Beijing probably could develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future. Although specific Chinese programs for laser ASAT have not been identified, press articles indicate an interest in developing this capability and Beijing may be working on appropriate technologies.
China has extensive space-related cooperation programs with many countries. Although most of these projects are described as scientific or civilian in nature, militarily significant technology transfer nonetheless likely occurs in many of them.
According to press reporting, Moscow and Beijing currently have 11 joint space projects underway. These include cooperative manned space activities. The Chinese also have shown strong interest in Western--Canadian and German--radar satellite capabilities, to include a possible purchase of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite systems. China recently signed a contract to launch an Italian-built communications satellite with 28 ku-band transponders in 2001; two earlier contracts appear to involve research into "observation and data detection satellites" that will be built jointly by both countries.
China’s Xian Satellite Control Site and the French national space agency announced a program of cooperation for satellite command and control in February 1999. A December 1998 press report stated that China has signed intergovernmental agreements and memoranda on aerospace cooperation with the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Brazil. In addition, Beijing has promoted technical and economic cooperation and exchanges of different types, including jointly developing satellites, with corporations, enterprises, and research institutes in more than 70 countries and areas.
Since 1998, China and the United States have signed three intergovernmental agreements on launching services. Several US satellite-manufacturing companies have signed agreements on commercial satellite launching services, involving a total of some 30 satellites. The satellite "Sinosat"--jointly developed by China, France, and Germany--was launched successfully in 1999. Moreover, in the form of a joint venture, China and Germany have made improvements to the Dongfanghong 3 communications satellite and have worked on a new generation of similar satellites.
According to December 1998 South Korean press reports, South Korea and China are expected to share data and information collected by their respective remote sensing satellites. November 1998 Chinese media reported a jointly funded contract with Holland for a cooperative project to develop and use a new satellite to monitor desertification and crop yields in China. Chinese scientists likewise have been reported studying minisatellite technologies in Great Britain. Chinese and British entities apparently have established a joint venture to build and launch China's first privately built satellite.
China’s aerospace industry also is seeking to integrate GPS and Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) guidance technology into fighters and helicopters. The China Aerospace Corporation displayed a GPS receiver at an exhibition in Beijing in September 1996 and provided brochures advertising both a 12-channel GPS receiver and a 12-channel GPS/GLONASS receiver. One brochure showed a space launch vehicle, suggesting GPS use in missile applications. Information obtained at a more recent air show indicates that all of China's new fighters will incorporate GPS navigation systems. China's military-backed industries also have entered into joint ventures with foreign firms to produce GPS receivers, which may find their way to military weapons. To complement GPS/GLONASS navigation aids, China has been attempting to acquire commercial satellite imagery from various foreign countries. This widely available satellite imagery could be used in conjunction with GPS/GLONASS to develop digital terrain maps for targeting, missile guidance, and planning.
3. Other Technology Developments
a. Anti-radiation missile development
China reportedly is developing two anti-radiation surface-to-air missiles (SAMs): the FT-2000, which first surfaced in sales brochures at the September 1998 Farnborough Air Show, and the FT-2000A. The former SAM probably utilizes the yet-to-be-deployed HQ-9--an SA-10/ Patriot-class SAM--while the latter apparently uses the comparatively older HQ-2/CSA-1 SAM first seen in the late 1950s.
The missile associated with the FT-2000 is probably similar to the HQ-9 in size but may be somewhat slower. Its maximum range reportedly is about 100 km, with a maximum altitude of approximately 20 km. A complete FT-2000 battalion probably would consist of a command platoon and three batteries. Sales brochure acquired at Farnborough dubbed the FT-2000 an "AWACS killer." The FT-2000 could be deployed as a stand-alone air defense system or deployed as part of another system. Although Beijing has stated publicly that the FT-2000 will be available for foreign export around the year 2001, it is more likely that it will not be available until the second half of the decade. If a foreign customer cannot be found, development could take longer or not occur at all.
According to a China sales brochure, the FT-2000A SAM will use a highly-modified HQ-2/ CSA-1 missile that has been equipped with a passive radio frequency homing seeker operating in the 2- to 6-GHz band. The FT-2000A also will contain a new millimeter-wave band fuze, a new guidance-and-control section, and a new 60 kg fragmentation warhead. The missile has a cutoff valve for thrust adjustment while in flight, probably to extend its range. The missile seeker is loaded with the target aircraft’s radio frequency (RF) signature before launch and relies on this information for tracking and intercept. The missile has an estimated maximum range of 60 km, with a maximum altitude of 18,000 meters.
A stand-alone FT-2000A battery consists of a central control station and twelve launchers, each holding one missile. The central control station has one master passive sensor and three auxiliary passive sensors. The auxiliary passive sensors coordinate with the master passive sensor through triangulation to determine angle and range of targets emitting in the 2- to 6-GHz band. This configuration is totally passive, relying on the RF emissions of the target.
A composite fire unit consists of FT-2000A launchers and missiles, integrated with standard SAM components like those of the HQ-2, SA-2, or SA-3. Although a special fire control unit and launcher are required, this configuration allows anti-jamming missiles to replace several of the command guided missiles normally associated with these SAMs.
b. Missile Defense Developments
China’s ability to defend against cruise missiles is considered extremely limited, while its antitheater ballistic missile capability (ATBM) and its antiballistic missile (ABM) capability is considered non-existent. However, Beijing reportedly is developing state-of-the-art SAMs, which over the next 10-20 years will improve its ability to defend against cruise missiles and TBMs; however, no significant advances with respect to developing ABM capabilities are anticipated during this period. Most of Beijing’s developmental SAMs appear to be derivatives of existing systems.
In recent years, the Chinese have embarked on an aggressive program to procure state-of-the-art Russian SAM systems and related technologies. To date, limited numbers of the SA-10b, the SA-10c, and SA-15 SAMs have been sold to China. These Russian air defense systems are being used operationally to fill gaps in China’s air defense structure. However, these systems provide only a rudimentary, limited defense against aircraft and cruise missiles. In an effort to acquire greater air defense depth, Beijing can be expected to attempt to glean technology from its purchased items to build its own air defense weapons. In addition, China also can be expected to try to develop a viable ATBM and ABM capability by either producing its own weapons or acquiring them from foreign sources.
Several SAM systems currently in the PLA inventory are assessed to have a limited capability against cruise missiles. These include the CSA-5 and the Hong Qi-7 (HQ-7), a copy of the French CROTALE system. Development of a follow-on variant of the CSA-5 with an improved capability to counter cruise missiles is possible. The HQ-7 series of SAMs also could be replaced sometime in the future by a follow-on system with an improved capability to engage cruise missiles. The HQ-9 SAM--currently under development--is believed modeled after the US PATRIOT. It reportedly is intended to provide long-range defense against fixed-wing aircraft, as well as against TBMs. According to Chinese open press reports, the HQ-16 SAM is a Russian-Chinese co-development project, possibly involving SA-11 technology. In addition, Beijing reportedly is developing a short-range SAM system based on the SA-15.
Currently, the PLAN’s surface units are ill equipped for air defense, particularly ASCMs. Only a handful of the PLAN’s approximately 60 destroyers and frigates are equipped with SAMs; the remainder are outfitted with anti-aircraft guns of various calibers. The few existing SAM systems have extremely limited ranges and are useful only for point defense. No long-range shipborne SAM systems currently exist in the inventory. China reportedly is seeking to address its naval air defense shortcomings through the development of a naval variant of the HQ-9 SAM. The PLAN already has deployed--albeit in limited numbers--a naval variant of the HQ-7. The SA-N-7 SAM system which will be acquired from Russia as part of the SOVREMENNYY destroyer deal is a modern, medium-range naval SAM system; however, it will have only a limited capability against cruise missiles.
c. Subsurface Warfare
China’s subsurface warfare capabilities are modest compared with Western standards, but they are considered effective against most other East Asian navies. The PLAN’s equipment is less sophisticated, older, and noisier. Its personnel are undereducated, the senior enlisted concept is new, and training and exercises lack realism. China currently has access to a wide variety of technology sources and actively engages in technology transfer to further its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) programs. As China combines domestic research and development with submarine-related technology acquired through direct purchase and transfer from foreign countries, particularly Russia, the PLAN’s ASW capabilities are expected to improve over time.
The acquisition of four KILO attack submarines from Russia reportedly has provided the PLAN with access to technology in quieting and sonar development, as well as weapons systems. China can be expected to try to incorporate some aspects of these technologies into its domestic submarine construction programs, although it will take the navy many years before it can use effectively the advanced technology now available. China’s most modern indigenously built diesel attack submarine is the SONG. It also reportedly incorporates technologies acquired from Russia, as well as from Western countries. The PLAN currently has five HAN nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) in its inventory and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)--the XIA. Beijing’s next-generation nuclear submarine programs are expected to reflect a significant amount of Russian influence. China is believed to have good access to a wide variety of foreign sonars, to include passive ranging sonars, flank array sonars, variable-depth sonars, as well as helicopters equipped with dipping sonars.
The PLAN’s mine stockpiles include vintage Russian moored-contact and bottom influence mines, as well as an assortment of domestically built mines. China currently produces the EM11 bottom-influence mine; the EM31 moored mine; the EM32 moored influence mine; the EM52 rocket-propelled rising mine; and, the EM-53 ship-laid bottom influence mine which is remotely controlled by a shore station. China is believed to have available acoustically activated remote control technology for its EM53. This technology probably could be used with other Chinese ship-laid mines including the EM52. Application of this technology could allow entire mines to be laid in advance of hostilities in a dormant position and activated or deactivated when required. China reportedly has completed development of a mobile mine and may be producing improved variants of Russian bottom mines and moored-influence mines. Over the next decade, China likely will attempt to acquire advanced propelled-warhead mines, as well as submarine-launched mobile bottom mines.
d. Antiship Cruise Missiles
There currently are four types of antiship cruise missiles in the PLAN. These ASCMs include the CSS-N-1/SCRUBBRUSH missile carried aboard the JIANGHU I-class frigate (FF); the CSS-N-2/ SAFFLOWER onboard the LUDA-class destroyer (DD); the CSS-N-4/C801/ SARDINE carried by the JIANGHU III-class FF; and, the CH/SS-N-6 /C802/SACCADE carried on board various destroyers, frigates, and guided missile patrol boats (PPGs). The C802 is an extended range version of the solid fuel C801 missile. The SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM system likely will be deployed on the two SOVREMENNYY-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) purchased from Russia.
e. Low Observable Technologies
China reportedly embarked on an extensive national effort to understand and develop low observable (LO) technology in the 1980s. Indigenous efforts likley have grown in maturity and understanding so as to allow analysis of foreign capabilities and attempt to duplicate past research. Chinese scientists are said to have an excellent theoretical understanding of LO technology, but apparently lack practical experience that comes with decades of applied research. China appears to have begun multiple programs to apply basic signature reduction technologies to its fighter aircraft programs and reportedly is developing new fighter aircraft which will incorporate LO technology.
f. Laser Weapons
China is believed to have a highly developed electro-optic industry, as well as the ability to field blinding laser weapons, including tactical laser weapons. Beijing offered the ZM-87 neodymium laser blinder for sale at defense exhibitions in Manila and Abu Dhabi in 1995 and may be developing an advanced version of this system with improved range and antisensor capabilities. Although the ZM-87 is intended for use primarily against ground targets, it could be used against aircraft. China also may be developing improved blinding weapons incorporating automatic targeting and countermeasure resistance; it also reportedly is investigating the feasibility of ship-borne laser weapons for air defense. Future laser systems most likely will emphasize the use of advanced optical techniques for improved target acquisition and pointing and tracking. Lasers with increased power and efficiency also are said to be under consideration.